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Abstract
Peace is one of most widely used yet highly contested concepts in contemporary politics. What consti-
tutes peace? That broad analytic inquiry motivates this article, which focuses on the contentious dis-
courses of peacewithin a society besieged bywidespread trafficking and use of illegal drugs. Focusing
on the illegal drug problem in Colombia and the Philippines, the central puzzle of this paper consti-
tutes two fundamental questions: How do state leaders justify their respective “war on drugs”? How
do they construct and discursively articulate ideals of peace in the context of the illegal drug problem?
This paper compares the post-9/11 Colombian war on drugs (2002–2010) vis-à-vis the Philippine war
on drugs under the Duterte administration (2016–2019), particularly in terms of how their presidential
administrations articulate “peace” in the context of resolving the drug problem. The paper examines
the varying discourses of peace, investigates how those local discourses relate to global discourses
on peace and illegal drugs, and underscores how and under which conditions those peace discourses
portray the material distributive conflicts in those societies. The core argument states that the Uribe
and Duterte administrations primarily deployed the notion of peace as a justificatory discourse for
increased state repression, intensified criminalization of the drug problem, and the reluctance of the
state in embracing a public health approach to the proliferation of illegal drugs.
Keywords: peace, human rights, Colombia, Philippines, Alvaro Uribe, Rodrigo Duterte
Introduction
Peace is one of the most widely used yet highly contested
concepts in contemporary politics. Some politicians in-
voke peace as a goal that could be achieved through
the intensification of state violence. Leaders of powerful
countries invoke peace—together with other supposedly
noble objectives such as democracy, stability, security—
as a justification for militaristic foreign intervention in a
weak country often situated in the global South. In his
widely cited work on peace, Johan Galtung (1969, 167)
argues that one of the principal ways of defining peace
is to characterize it as the absence of violence. Yet, this
method of defining a concept through negation is prob-
lematic, particularly because it does not fully substantiate
the core empirical features of the concept and the situa-
tion whereby peace supposedly exists. Later on, Galtung
(1996) introduces the notion of positive peace, which
highlights positive societal features such as the existence
of social justice and equity. In both definitions, Galtung
conceptualizes peace as a structural condition that consti-
tutes several empirical features. Notably, contemporary
scholarship on security studies1 has yet to consider peace
1 For a comprehensive analytic review on various notions
of peace, refer to Richmond (2006): victor’s peace, insti-
tutional peace, constitutional peace, and civil peace. To a
substantial extent those four peace concepts underscore
the material–structural conditions of peace, but they do
not highlight the dynamics of peace as a discursive tool
of justification and political mobilization.
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as a discursive tool (rather than as a macro-material con-
dition) that political actors use in advancing concrete pol-
icy aims.Hence,what constitutes peace? In a society beset
by the proliferation of civilian deaths, crimes, and state
violence, how is peace best reimagined and actualized?
How does the state leadership frame and discursively ad-
vocate their visions of peace amid a society besieged by
violence?
That broad analytic inquiry animates this article,
whereby I focus on the discourse of peace within a soci-
ety besieged by widespread trafficking and use of illegal
drugs. In recent years, states have primarily relied on vio-
lence, coercion, and public shaming of illegal drug users,
and in many cases, have facilitated the systematic killings
of civilians (Björnhead 2004; Mercille 2011; Morton
2012; Paley 2015). This strategy of relying on state vi-
olence also motivated non-state criminal organizations
to bolster their firepower, in a bid to maintain their con-
trol and profits from the global drug trade. Based on the
International Drug Policy Consortium (2018, 7), the il-
licit demand for narcotic drugs at the global level is as-
tounding. Around 275 million people aged 15–64 have
used illegal drugs at least once in 2016, a statistic that
marks a 31 percent increase since 2009 (International
Drug Policy Consortium 2018). Globally, the majority of
these people preferred cannabis as top choice, followed
by opioids and amphetamines. Accordingly, the use of
methamphetamines has increased in the global South, es-
pecially in North and West Africa and East Asia. The
global drug market, particularly between 2009 and 2017,
has witnessed the introduction of around 800 new psy-
choactive substances, while the illegal usage of medically
prescribed drugs has skyrocketed in the global North,
particularly in North America. While national drug poli-
cies vary, several states have framed illegal drug use as
a criminal problem rather than as a public health issue.
In the last decade, nearly half a million civilians die each
year as a result of illegal drugs (International Drug Policy
Consortium 2018, 8).
Since US President Richard Nixon’s war on drugs in
1971, particularly when criminal law enforcement took
control of illegal drug regulation, illegal drug use has
proliferated, global drug syndicates have expanded, and
the number of civilian deaths has increased. In Nixon’s
war on drugs, the criminalization and public shaming
of people who use illegal drugs facilitated mass impris-
onment, with global statistics suggesting that one in five
detainees were caught, many of whom simply possessed
such drugs for personal use (International Drug Policy
Consortium 2018, 8). Hence, notwithstanding “the in-
creasing investments in enforcement-based supply reduc-
tion efforts aimed at disrupting global drug supply, illegal
drug prices have generally decreased while drug purity
has generally increased since 1990 . . . thereby suggest-
ing that expanding efforts at controlling the global illegal
drug market through law enforcement are failing” (Werb
et al. 2013, 1). This sentiment of failure over the criminal-
ization of drug use has been gaining traction in the last
few years, as vividly expressed by former New Zealand
Prime Minister Helen Clark, a global leader in the fight
against illegal drugs (2018, 1):
In my experience as head of my country’s government
and previously a health minister, as a former senior
official at the United Nations, and more recently as
a member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy,
I’ve found debates on drug policy tend to be divisive
and passionately ideological. On one point, however,
there is a clear and growing consensus: Around the
world, the so-called “war on drugs” is failing.
This sense of failure begs the question as to which
ideal do current global and national drug policies de-
viate from. If the societal battle against illegal drugs is
construed as a war, how is victory in such a war defined
and constructed? If the oppositional concept of violence
is peace, then how is peace attained in a society besieged
by the use of illegal drugs? In the attempt to curb the
drug problem, state leaders and elites invoke politically
appealing concepts to mobilize support and resources for
intensified state violence against drug syndicates. Perhaps
the most widely invoked linguistic tool in the discursive
battle against illegal drugs refers to the notion of peace.
Rather than focusing solely on thematerial features of the
drug wars, I also focus on the discursive and ideational
articulations of the government’s visions of peace.
Empirically, I focus on the illegal drug problem in con-
temporary Colombia and the Philippines, where govern-
ments have historically and primarily deployed a mili-
taristic approach. Particularly, the central puzzle of this
paper constitutes two fundamental questions concerning
the two aforementioned country cases: How do the polit-
ical elites and state leaders therein justify their respective
“war on drugs”? How do they construct and discursively
articulate ideals of peace in the context of the illegal drug
problem? This paper compares the post-9/11 Colombian
war on drugs (2002–2010) vis-à-vis the Philippine war
on drugs under the Duterte administration (2016–2019),
particularly in terms of how their presidential adminis-
trations articulate “peace” in the context of resolving the
drug problem.
I maintain that the Uribe and Duterte administrations
deployed the notion of peace2 as a justificatory discourse
2 It is analytically difficult to ascertain whether Uribe and
Duterte only pay lip service to peace. The empirical ev-
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for increased state repression, intensified criminalization
of the drug problem, and the reluctance of the state in
considering a public health approach towards the pro-
liferation of narcotics. The Duterte administration con-
ceptualizes peace as a condition where law and order
are achieved, or more tangibly, when state power could
overcome contestations from many, if not all, forms of
political dissent. The Uribe administration, on the other
hand, upholds that promoting democracy and human
rights is necessary to secure peace, and it maintains that
increased state repression effectively thwarts threats to
peace. In both cases, peace and other discursive ideals
such as the rule of law, order, and security were strate-
gically deployed in a bid to consolidate the authority of
the Duterte and Uribe administrations amid highly con-
tentious political resistance from civil society organiza-
tions and human rights activists.
In building those key points, this paper is organized
as follows. First, the next section reviews the theoretical
literature on peace, revisits the current literature on war
on drugs in the Philippines and Colombia, and substan-
tiates the arguments that directly link the relationship
between “peace” discourses in the context of the drug
wars. The next part presents the case study analysis of the
Philippine war on drugs under the Duterte administra-
tion, which will be followed by the section that analyzes
the Colombia’s war on drugs under the Uribe administra-
tion. This paper concludes by discussing the comparative
findings of the two case studies, by drawing some broad
lessons for addressing the illegal drug problem, and by
highlighting the implications of the criminalization of the
war on drugs on states’ human rights commitments to its
citizens.
theme in their public speeches. Before their presiden-
tial tenure, both politicians depended upon violence in
order to promote stability. As an ex-provincial governor,
Uribe strongly supported a national scheme that commis-
sioned civilians in gathering intelligence in support of se-
curity services. That program was known as CONVIVIR,
which was strongly criticized for its human rights abuses
(Human Rights Watch 1998). Similarly, Duterte’s long ca-
reer as a city mayor witnessed his support for state-
sanctioned “death squads” (known as Davao Death
Squad) that are known for extrajudicial killings of civilians
(mostly poor people and alleged criminals) in Davao City.
Kusaka (2017a, 49) describes Duterte’s politics as demon-
strative of “the coexistence of compassion and violence
under a patriarchal bosswhomaintains justice outside of
the law.”
Theorizing Peace Discourses: Illegal Drugs,
Human Rights, and Democracy
How should we reconsider peace in an empirical analy-
sis of the drug war discourses? In this study, I consider
peace as a desirable, overtly abstract, and morally ap-
pealing “meta-discourse” that refers to a broad set of
socio-political conditions upon which particular forms
of violence are perceived to have been repressed or un-
dermined, if not totally eliminated. My notion of peace
does not have a comprehensively defined set of empirical
indicators decided a priori as supposedly indicative of a
condition of peace in a given society. Rather, following
Clifford Bob’s (2019) conceptualization of rights, I argue
that peace is a flexible discursive tool that political ac-
tors use to rally and to mobilize support for a particular
policy strategy, and in some cases, perhaps a broader rev-
olutionary movement. Similar to loosely defined concepts
such as rights, justice, equality, peace refers to the aspi-
rational political condition that pertains to the relative
absence of violence, in its many forms of manifestation—
ranging from those at the level of the individual (physical
and psychological) and collective (repression of group-
rights). It is likely that no political community persis-
tently desires to endure systemic and pervasive violence.
That premise reinforces the idea as to why peace enjoys
profound moral resonance as well as perhaps quite uni-
versal acceptance across societies and across historical
time. While policies and political actions may have vary-
ing intended and unintended effects upon a given political
community, politicians and other societal actors strate-
gically deploy and invoke peace as a rallying cry to jus-
tify a wide panoply of policy actions that they themselves
may know as inherently violent or anti-peace by nature.
As Rainer Forst (2017, 12) rightly contends, the “ques-
tion of justification” is a “political and practical question,
and thereby lends the aforementioned concepts dialecti-
cal resonance: and on the other hand, it starts from the
analysis of the real relations of subjugation.” Simply put,
justification is crucial in discourse particularly in politi-
cal communities, whereby power is unevenly distributed,
and in such cases, justifications form the non-material ba-
sis for varying forms of subjugation and control over par-
ticular groups of individuals.
What are political discourses? Discourses refer to a
set of propositions, utterances, assertions, and beliefs ut-
tered in the public sphere for the particular purpose of ad-
vancing a policy action or a broad belief-system (Regilme
2018b, c). The public sphere refers to the societal space
that represents the meeting point of discursive battles
between civil society, state, and the market (Habermas
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the aim of providing rebuttals and counter-responses to
opposing arguments raised by their opponents. In the
context of a constitutionally guaranteed liberal democ-
racy, discursive justifications aim to provide reasons and
legitimating ideas in support of a particular policy ac-
tion. Yet, those discursive justifications do not exist in-
dependent of the material circumstances that underpin a
given political community. Rather, those material circum-
stances, while they do exist independently despite the ab-
sence of a conscious human observer, shape how and un-
der which conditions discursive justifications are formed
and by whom. This issue of whose interpretations matter
in the public sphere requires an analysis of how material
power is distributed amongst various groups of actors
who participate in the formation of the public sphere.
Methodologically, I highlight the key substantive
discourses that dominated in the political speeches and
texts of the officials of the Philippine government (2016–
2019) and the Colombian government (2001–2010),
with the focus on President Rodrigo Duterte of the
former and President Alvaro Uribe3 of the latter. Both
countries4 are fairly similar in a number of relevant
and comparable aspects. As middle-income countries
located in the Global South, Colombia and the Philip-
pines have nominally electoral democratic systems with
constitutionally guaranteed human rights for its citizens,
a relatively liberal democratic political culture, consider-
able levels of material inequalities, and a long-standing
problem on widespread use and trafficking of illegal
narcotics. Because of those notable similarities, the com-
parative analysis effectively highlights how and under
which conditions two democratically elected executive
3 I have chosen the Uribe administration (rather than the
current Duque presidency that only started in August
2018) because of its relatively longer duration of service,
which provides large range of empirical information on
thewar on drugs and the human rights abuses during that
time.
4 Although I compare two cases of “national” war on
drugs, my analysis seeks to avoid a “methodological na-
tionalist” bias that has dominated mainstream security
studies in two ways: (1) by raising the possibility that
a militaristic approach has increasingly became a more
common practice, thereby demonstrating a sort of global
diffusion of normative attitudes towards illegal drugs, and
(2) by highlighting how war on drugs-oriented patterns
of discourses, material resources, and concrete political
actions can be observed in distinctive political spaces
(e.g., Latin America and Southeast Asia). For further the-
oretical discussion on space and global security, refer to
Adamson (2016).
governments have weaponized peace discourses in order
to make increased state repression and militarization of a
public health problem more appealing to their domestic
constituencies.
The empirical analysis herein constitutes a “plausibil-
ity probe” (Levy 2008, 8), whereby the two cases of the
drug wars illustrate my theoretical propositions on the
role of discourse as justificatory tools for increased state
repression, using the notion of peace as the core concept.
The discursive dynamics and the material circumstances
of the state-initiated drug wars in Colombia and the
Philippines are well-documented in a wide range of schol-
arly literature in the social sciences, especially in politi-
cal science, international relations, and area studies. Be-
cause of this wide swath of vetted scholarly literature on
the drug wars, I analyze and theorize the dominant dis-
course patterns as well as various news articles and other
open-source speeches and government documents in or-
der to illustrate my broad theoretical arguments. For that
reason, the case studies probe the plausibility of such the-
oretical arguments and contribute to a better understand-
ing of the government’s political logic and discursive jus-
tifications for the extremely violent state-led drug wars,
which led to the human rights disasters in Colombia and
the Philippines. While the case studies do not make an
exhaustive discourse analysis of the presidential admin-
istrations in those two countries, the comparative study
relies on a wide range of empirical sources from Colom-
bia, the Philippines, as well as international sources: pri-
mary documents of speeches from official government
websites; reports from various national and international
news media outlets; and, secondary literature and empiri-
cal accounts from local journalists and scholars. Employ-
ing data triangulation, I cross-verify particular pieces of
empirical information across various sources with nom-
inally different interests (e.g., local versus international;
public versus private media agencies) in order to ensure
reliability of the comparative analysis.
This article contributes to the relevant literatures
on security studies, human rights scholarship, and in-
ternational relations (IR) in several ways. Notably, it
redresses some of the analytic limitations of securiti-
zation theory, which has been dominant in the study
of domestic state repression and international politics.
First, whereas securitization theory usually focuses
on the ideational aspects by underscoring the notion
of security as a speech-act (Waever 1995), this study
highlights how ideational-legitimization narratives (such
as peace discourses vis-à-vis threat construction) and
material actions (state and non-state violence) funda-
mentally constitute security as a sociological condition
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period, geographic space, and actor positionality. While
securitization theorists insist that “the way to study
securitization is to study discourse” (Buzan, Waever,
and de Wilde 1998, 25), I show that the construction
of security emanates from competition amongst social
actors that generate actions both in the ideational and
materialist realms of public contestation. Second, as the
Colombian and Philippine cases show, the legitimization
and eventual policy implementation of the war on drugs
depended both on the public demonization of anyone
involved in illegal narcotics and the insistence of a
“peace” utopia that the governments seek to achieve
through militarization. Although “securitization process
is inherently negative” as it “bypasses normal demo-
cratic procedures and fast-tracks issues into the secretive
and undoubtedly hostile realm of security” (Sjöstedt
2017, 14; see also Aradau 2004), the analysis herein
shows how legitimization narratives through peace
discourses—framed as positive, emancipatory utopias by
state actors advocating for militarization—often occur in
openly contested public spheres and could facilitate the
loss of human lives. Third, this paper engages with the
emerging literature on the “varieties of peace” program
by demonstrating that peace represents a multifaceted
and politically contentious process of “becoming rather
than an end state” (Jarstad et al. 2019, 2). In other words,
peace should be conceived not only as a mere sociological
condition but as a process of contestation of discursive
justifications, legitimation narratives, and mobilization
of resources in support of distinctive political utopias.
Besides, the article illustrates how supposedly neutral
and universally appealing meta-discourses such as peace
could be used as weapons for regime consolidation and
could engender tangible and material consequences such
as severe human rights crisis. Regime consolidation re-
quires legitimation narratives, and in the case of Uribe
and Duterte, legitimacy was sought through the strate-
gic invocation of state security-oriented notion of peace.
By showing how peace is a highly contested rallying dis-
course, I contribute to the nascent theoretical develop-
ments in peace studies (Klem 2018) and human rights
scholarship (Bob 2019; Regilme 2019, 2020) that high-
light the inherently politicized nature of moral concepts
and their concrete distributive consequences to the soci-
ety that impact the existential survival of its more vulner-
able members. In addition, this article is arguably the first
in security studies, political science, and human rights lit-
erature that investigates the contemporary war on drugs
using theoretically oriented systematic comparisons be-
tween Colombia and the Philippines.5
5 So much of the insightful and rich empirical literature
on the contemporary Colombian and Philippine war on
Hence, my comparative analysis of the drugs wars
in the Philippines and Colombia includes the focus on
the structural-material circumstances of the drug wars as
well as its ideational features. As shown in Figure 1, the
comparative summary of the two countries’ drug wars
is presented based on several key benchmarks. In terms
of the material factors, I analytically describe the broad
socio-political context and the purported material basis
of the drug war in each country, with a focus on the
features of the primary actors deploying state violence,
their primary targets, the key features of the human rights
crisis that emerged from state violence, and the polit-
ical logics of the incumbent government. In regard to
ideational features, I provide some preliminary insights
concerning the Colombian and Philippine governments’
dominant perspectives on peace, human rights, and their
over-all stance on unarmed political dissent amidst a
perceived crisis of illegal drug use and trafficking.
Thus, understanding how and why transformative policy
strategies emerge require the intertwining and mutually
reinforcing interactions of material and ideational fac-
tors, as those processes will be demonstrated by the case
studies of the drug wars in Colombia and the Philippines.
The overarching argument maintains that the discursive
justifications and resource mobilization in support of
the drug wars were systematic attempts to consolidate
the authority of Duterte and Uribe within and beyond
their state’s coercive apparatus, particularly by legitimiz-
ing increased state violence through discourses of state
security-oriented notion of peace. Following Galtung’s
(1969, 1996) emphasis on peace as a set of material con-
ditions and recent scholarly studies of how morally ap-
pealing concepts are used as ideational tools in political
contestations (Bob 2019; Klem 2018), I illustrate how
government officials deploy peace as a justificatory in-
strument in order to facilitate the broad acceptance and
implementation of particular security policies that have
drugs employ a methodologically-nationalist approach
and intra-regional comparative approach rather than a
cross-regional comparative outlook. For the Colombian
case, see Bagley (1991), Thoumi (1995), Tickner (2003),
Arnson and Tickner (2010), Holmes et al. (2010), Rosen
(2014), Tate (2015) and Regilme (2018c). For the Philip-
pine case, see Thompson (2016), Simangan (2017), and
Gallagher et al. (2020) among many others. The Colom-
bian war on drugs, however, has been analyzed using
an intra-regional comparison, as shown by the study of
Borda (2009). Notably,Walch’s study (2016) is perhaps the
only piece that compares the two countries, particularly
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Figure 1. Comparing the material and ideational logics of the war on drugs in the Philippines and Colombia.
concrete material consequences to human lives. The table
above presents the organizing principles upon which the
comparative analysis of the drug wars will be conducted.
The next section begins with the case study of the Philip-
pine war on drugs under the government of President Ro-
drigo Duterte (2016-ongoing).
Duterte’s War on Drugs in the Philippines
On the 30th June 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was sworn into
office as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philip-
pines. Duterte defeated four other key contenders in the
2016 presidential elections, with 40 percent of the total
number of votes with the second (Manuel Roxas) and
third placer (Grace Poe) garnering 23 percent and 21
percent, respectively. Those other presidential contenders
upheld policies that speak of relative continuity to the
strategies of the administration of the President Benigno
Aquino (2010–2016),while the Duterte campaign sought
to depart from Aquino’s liberal democratic-oriented pol-
icy agenda.
Duterte’s core agenda focused on three key policy
priorities. First, he vowed to push for the shift from
the current, centralized system of governance to fully
federalized system. In this way, provincial governments
acquire more power in managing their own affairs
in ways that are not possible in the current system
(Casiple 2019, 180). While this agenda is unsurprising
considering that Duterte was the first provincial politi-
cian to be elected directly to the highest elected office
in the country, the proposal in support of federalism
also marks the weaknesses of the post-1986 electoral
democracy system. Specifically, Duterte and his allies
criticized how previous electoral administrations since
the fall of the Macros dictatorship failed to deliver
the socio-economic benefits of liberalization across the
society, thereby characterizing such a democratic system
as elitist (Thompson 2016). Second, Duterte’s policy






/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa022/5848658 by guest on 29 M
ay 2020
SALVADOR SANTINO F. REGILME 7
United States as a security guarantor toward a much
closer bilateral relationship with China. Third, Duterte’s
centerpiece agenda includes his “war on drugs” that
generated the worst state-initiated human rights crisis in
the country’s modern political history (Simangan 2017).
My empirical analysis of Duterte’s war on drugs con-
sists of two key components. The first part constitutes the
material features of intensified state repression, while the
second part focuses on the ideational justifications for the
approach in solving the proliferation of the use of illegal
drugs.
What were the material aspects that constitute
Duterte’s war on drugs? The Philippine war on drugs for-
mally started right after Duterte’s start of tenure, and he
argued that the use of illegal drugs in the country was
increasing in the 2000s, and therefore drastic measures
from the government are required. Specifically, in his first
State of the Nation Address in 2016, Duterte attempted
to bolster his case for a crisis of illegal drugs:
Two years ago, PDEA [Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency] came out with a statement that there are 3
million drug addicts in this country. That was two
or three years ago. How do you think – would the
number incrementally [sic, grow] if we count now?
Give it a liberal addition.Maybe, gawin mo na [make
it] [700,000]. So three million seven hundred thou-
sand [3.7 million]. The number is quite staggering and
scary.
The Duterte administration framed the war on drugs
as the effective and inevitable response to the widespread
use of illegal drugs, especially methamphetamine and
cannabis.Notwithstanding “several decades of drug con-
trol, the prevalence of drug use, particularly metham-
phetamine, is on the rise” both in Southeast Asia, and
specifically in the Philippines (Lasco 2018, 40). While
drug addiction is a serious problem in the Philippines, vic-
tims of this social menace struggle amidst the inadequate
public health and rehabilitation facilities. Duterte con-
tends that the illegal drug situation in the Philippines pose
apocalyptic threats to the society and destructive effects
to individuals, and the only way to combat such an immi-
nent disaster to the Philippine society is through his ad-
ministration’s state violence-focused approach that vig-
orously implements extrajudicial killings of all suspected
criminals and drug users (Barrera 2017, 350). Rather
than treating the drug problem as a public health issue,
the Duterte administration mobilized the state’s coercive
apparatus in violently killing and harassing individuals
allegedly involved in illegal drugs. As Columbia-based
professor Sheila Coronel (2019, 19) rightly maintains,
“the level of illegal drug use in the Philippines is lower
than that in the United States or Thailand, but Duterte’s
warnings about the drug scourge have fueled the public’s
anxieties about safety.” Moreover, Duterte (2016a, 40)
even made irrelevant and morally despicable remarks in
an attempt to bolster his case for increased state violence
against illegal drugs:
Hitler massacred three million Jews. Now there is
three million, there’s three million drug addicts. There
are. I’d be happy to slaughter them. At least if Ger-
many had Hitler, the Philippines would have you
know, my victims, I would like to be all criminals to
finish the problem of my country and save the next
generation from perdition.
How did the Duterte administration justify extraju-
dicial killings of illegal drug users and traffickers? First,
Duterte made the case that illegal drugs facilitate the
breakdown of political order through the involvement
of politicians, military and police agents, and ordinary
civilians. He argued that various crimes, acts of social
deviance, and other socio-economic problems such as
poverty can be traced to widespread illegal drug use. In
Duterte’s world-view, illegal drugs represent the founda-
tional cause of long-standing societal problems such as
poverty, political corruption, and economic uncertainty
(Regilme 2016). In his first public speech right after as-
suming the presidency in June 2016, Duterte (2016b, 12)
argued that “the problems that bedevil our country today
which need to be addressed with urgency are corruption,
both in the high and low echelons in government, crimi-
nality in the streets and the rampant sale of illegal drugs
in all strata of Philippine society and the breakdown of
law and order.” In response to the urgency of the drug
problem, Duterte (2016b, 5–6) invoked state violence as
the only solution: “these sons of whores are destroying
our children. I warn you, don’t go into that, even if you’re
a policeman, because I will really kill you. . .If you know
of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself as get-
ting their parents to do it would be too painful.” During
the presidential campaigns, Duterte, who was then the
Mayor of Davao City, unashamedly argued (ABS-CBN
News 2015, 3–4 and 11).
Are you telling me that these criminals have human
rights to kill and human rights to continue their crim-
inal activities? What about the human rights of the
innocent victims and their orphans? A leader must be
a terror to the few who are evil in order to protect
the lives and well-being of the many who are good,"
We’re the ninth safest city… How do you think I did
it? How did I reach that title among the world’s safest
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By framing users of illegal drugs as the most dan-
gerous existential threat to the Philippine political order,
Duterte underscored the Philippine state’s failures in solv-
ing socio-economic problems including material inequal-
ity and political corruption. This simplistic framing of
the country’s entrenched problems as all linked to illegal
drugs gained some traction amongst Duterte’s support
base, while Duterte continued to demonize his predeces-
sor, former President Benigno Aquino (2010–2016) of the
Liberal Party, whose presidency facilitated increased eco-
nomic growth amidst increasing crime rates, and other
opposition politicians and critics,6 who advocate for a
non-violent approach to criminality and illegal drugs.
Duterte and his allies contend that Davao City
emerged as one of the “safest” cities in the country be-
cause of the effectiveness of extrajudicial killings, and
that claim “was the bedrock of his presidential cam-
paign. . .that emphasizes order above law which is par-
ticularly attractive to voters who are tired of the inef-
fectiveness of legal institutions in addressing crime and
disorder” (Simangan 2017, 5). Indeed, the Duterte ad-
ministration employed state agents in implementing state
violence in order to eliminate violently all suspected drug
addicts, users, and traffickers in ways that were not for-
mally sanctioned by law.
By framing illegal drugs users as the quintessential
culprits of many national problems such as poverty and
corruption, the Duterte administration sought to bolster
his legitimacy before and during his presidential term. As
Wataru Kusaka (2017b, 216) compellingly argue, there
are three key issues that played a crucial role in Philippine
electoral politics: poverty, morality, and ability. Accord-
ingly, success in presidential politics emanates from care-
ful instrumentalization of antagonism between “good”
and “bad” groups as well as moralization in the pub-
lic sphere. Attempting to provide moral justification for
6 For example, Duterte’s allies alleged that Senator Leila
de Lima, who remains to be the most prominent critic of
Duterte’s human rights abuses, as directly linked to illegal
drug trafficking. Since 2017, De Lima remains in prison on
the basis of drug trafficking charges amidst the very slow
processing of court trials, while many local and interna-
tional human rights organizations consider her as a “pris-
oner of conscience.” In January 2020, the US federal gov-
ernment, through the initiatives of the US Congress, has
mandated the State Department to impose sanctions and
travel bans to individuals and government officials who
are directly involved in the political imprisonment of De
Lima. This US initiative was part of the US Global Magnit-
sky Act (Buan 2020).
his anti-poor politics, Duterte blamed illegal drug users
(mostly from the lower economic class) as the cause of
all political and economic problems, while high-profile
traffickers with links to politicians are spared from state
violence. Based on Amnesty International’s investigation
on the profiles of the victims, the war on drugs created a
war against very poor people, as suggested by the wife of
a killed victim based in Metro Manila who attested that
(Wells 2017, 12):
Those who are rich are jailed and turned into wit-
nesses. How come the poor are being killed? In our
neighborhood…they usually kill those of us who have
families – people who sell to have a little money. If
people had other opportunities, they wouldn’t [sell
drugs].
Yet, Duterte’s claim about the purported improve-
ment in public security came at the cost of thousands
of civilians killed by state-sponsored agents during the
war on drugs. As shown in figure 2, the number of
civilian deaths resulting from state violence dramatically
increased in 2017, a year after the Duterte adminis-
tration launched its increased state repression against
suspected drug addicts and traffickers. Before Duterte’s
war on drugs, the administration of President Benigno
Aquino III focused on good governance, human rights,
and economic reforms, which likely contributed to the
decrease in the number of victims from state-based vio-
lence (Aquino III and Bradley 2010; Regilme 2015: 155–
193; Regilme and Untalan 2016).
The Duterte administration’s drug war constitutes
various discursive mechanisms of justification (Johnson
and Fernquest 2018, 363). First, the rhetoric and pol-
icy discourses of Duterte and his administration officials
encourage the killings of all those involved in narcotic
drugs.Duterte devalued the life of alleged criminals by ar-
guing that “there’s a whale of a difference between killing
an innocent person and killing a criminal. . .they ought
not to be mixed up” (Ranada 2017, 20–21) and justified
that the casualties of the drug wars were criminals who
ought to die. Second, police officers implement fictional
buy-bust operations, whereby the target suspects would
be accused of violent resistance and are eventually killed.
Third, police agents and suspected state-sponsored assas-
sins systematically yet covertly look for all targets and kill
them in ways that demonstrate acts of governmental ter-
rorism. In fact, the distinction between a buy-bust killing
and a regular extra-judicial killing is unclear, considering
that “if the victim did not have a gun, one can be given
to him after he is killed—and it frequently is” (Johnson






/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa022/5848658 by guest on 29 M
ay 2020
SALVADOR SANTINO F. REGILME 9
Figure 2. State-based violence in the Philippines (2008–2018). Pettersson et al. (2019).
The war on drugs deliberately targeted any suspected
drug users and traffickers, without any proper court-
sanctioned vetting and arrest warrants (Reyes 2019, 111–
112). In Duterte’s war on drugs, state agents employ two
key tactics. First, they systematically identify suspected
drug dealers, users, and alleged criminals and disclosing
their names in the media. Second, state agents passion-
ately justify the killing of those suspects as inevitable,
while publicly embarrassing the suspects’ families and
friends through the placement of placards on the dead
targets that indicate that they deserve death for their in-
volvement in drugs. Such tactics depend also on show-
casing the purported effectiveness of state violence in fos-
tering order and peace in the society, where, as Duterte
maintains, human rights and democratic governance al-
legedly failed (Reyes 2019, 111).
Who were the victims of the drug wars in the Philip-
pines? The large majority of the victims were financially
impoverished individuals living in slums. In a study con-
ducted by two Philippine universities and the Stabile Cen-
ter at Columbia University, 40 percent of the killings were
conducted in the slums of Metro Manila (between May
2016 and September 2017), and the dead civilians were
“typically tricycle drivers, constructionworkers, vendors,
farmers, jeepney barkers, garbage collectors, or were un-
employed” (Coronel, Kalaw-Tirol, and Pimentel 2019,
3). The official statistics from the Philippine National Po-
lice confirm that around 5,000 individuals were killed na-
tionwide by state agents between 2016 until 2018 (Ball
et al. 2019, 3). On June 2019, the Philippine police con-
tradicted its own earlier pronouncements and asserted
that 6,600 individual lives were killed by state agents
in their anti-drug operations (Maitem 2019, 2). In ad-
dition, approximately 30,000 victims were killed using
the “riding-in-tandem” tactic, which involves purport-
edly state-sanctioned two masked or hooded assassins
riding in a motorcycle and widely suspected as state-
sponsored agents (Maitem 2019, 3).
What was the political logic that underpinned the
state violence-oriented approach to addressing illegal
drugs? The most likely general explanation for the emer-
gence of a state-initiated human rights crisis in the con-
text of the war on drugs pertains to Rodrigo Duterte’s
attempt to bolster his political authority in two ways
(ABS-CBN News 2015; Coronel 2019). First, Duterte
relies on the political support from those who believe
that the problem of law and order in the country could
only be fully resolved through the full reliance on state
violence and disregard for democratic procedures and
human rights commitments. Second, by reinforcing the
coercive capacities of the military and the policy through
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of a potential coup. Notably, forty-six retired high-
ranking military and police officers were given ministe-
rial posts (positions as Cabinet Secretaries) and other in-
fluential positions in various government agencies and
government-owned corporations (Gita 2019), thereby
suggesting the administration’s attempt to quell the po-
tential of coup against Duterte’s leadership. Duterte even
vowed to hire more retired military officials into his ad-
ministration for the remaining three years of his presiden-
tial term. Notably, the majority of these retired military
and police officials came from Duterte’s political baili-
wick in southern Philippines. Moreover, the support of
the upper- and middle-classes is crucial to the survival
of the Duterte regime, particularly when such influential
class groups could potentially consolidate their resources
and influence in toppling an incumbent presidential ad-
ministration. As the majority of the war on drugs’ vic-
tims came from extremely poor background, the Duterte
regime wins the support of the elite and middle class
by providing them a (albeit false) sense of security and
safety (David et al. 2018; Go and De Ungria 2019). Dis-
missive of the legitimacy of non-violent approaches, the
war on drugs also aims to address poverty by killing
poor people in a way that bolsters wealthy elites’ sup-
port for Duterte. Specifically, the police and state agents
primarily implemented their killing operations in the fi-
nancially poor slums of Metro Manila and other under-
developed rural areas in the provinces, thereby targeting
poor Filipinos (Barrera 2017; Coronel, Kalaw-Tirol, and
Pimentel 2019).
While the war on drugs constitutes Duterte’s strategy
for regime consolidation, what exactly were the political
discourses and justifications that sought to justify such
a violent strategy? In justifying the war on drugs, how
did the Duterte administration and its allies construct no-
tions of peace and human rights? The Duterte adminis-
tration’s discourses instrumentally claims that peace de-
pends on the rule of law and the effective provision of
basic security. Duterte claims that the war on drugs could
generate peace, which is crucial for sustainable socio-
economic development. In his 2017 State of the Nation
Address (SONA), Duterte (2017, 11) claimed that the
“economy surges only when there is peace and order pre-
vailing in places where investors can pour [in] their cap-
ital and expertise” and referred to his successes in the
localized war on drugs in Davao City during his time as
its City Mayor. In the same speech, he also maintained
that the “fight against illegal drugs will continue because
that is the root cause of so much evil and so much suf-
fering [applause] that weakens the social fabric and de-
ters foreign investments from pouring in. . .the fight will
be unremitting as it will be unrelenting” (Duterte 2017,
12). In his 2019 SONA speech, Duterte (2019, 47) main-
tains that: “developmental gains will not be felt by our
people in the countryside if we cannot maintain law and
order. . . “Yang peace and security, wala “yan. [peace
and security are nothing]. . .we need to enforce the law.”
(Duterte 2019). Yet, the inconsistency and ambivalence
of Duterte’s policy views are well-known. In the same
SONA speech, Duterte (2019, 65) claimed that he “will
do [address the dispute] in the peaceful way, mindful of
the fact that it is our national pride and territorial in-
tegrity that are at stake.” The remarkable difference be-
tween Duterte’s policy approach on illegal drugs problem
and the South China Sea dispute suggests inconsistency
on the use of state violence. Walden Bello (2017, 83) ar-
gues that the core objective was “not to win the war on
drugs,” but “to promote a broader authoritarian agenda
by establishing a climate of intimidation and fear that
will make the destruction of democratic political institu-
tions. . .and their remaking in an authoritarian direction
a ‘walk in the park’”. Thus, the logic of the war on drugs
also rests on Duterte’s need for regime consolidation and
his broader coalition of allies.
The foregoing analysis shows two strands of ideas
concerning the Duterte administration’s views on peace.
On substantive content, peace refers to the scenario
where the Philippine state exercises full control of
marginalized groups, particularly the materially poor cit-
izens, in a way that protects the interest of capital and
wealth of the elites. In this way, peace refers to state se-
curity, which includes the consolidation of power of the
ruling presidential administration andwealthy elite allies.
Peace, in this view, does not include the freedom of the
poor people from state violence, as they remain key tar-
gets of the war on drugs without any recourse to proce-
dural justice and rehabilitative facilities, particularly for
those suffering from narcotic drug addiction. In advanc-
ing such an elitist view of peace, the Duterte administra-
tion employs several tactics. First, it reorients the state
apparatus as an instrument of violence not in the service
of the state’s human rights commitments to its citizens;
rather, state violence exclusively reinforces the interest
of incumbent presidential regime’s consolidation of au-
thority, while bolstering the interests of its ruling wealthy
elites. Second, the state’s discourses aim to dehumanize
poor people, who were characterized as worthy of being
killed in the interest of state security.
Uribe’s War on Drugs: Plan Colombia
Located in the Andean region in South America, Colom-
bia is one of the continent’s enduring electoral democ-
racies. Its population includes approximately 49 million
people, as of the year 2018, and almost four times larger
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Philippines is classified as a lowermiddle-income country,
Colombia is much wealthier with a GDP per capita twice
as large as the Philippines. For several decades, Colom-
bian people have suffered amidst the enduring asymmet-
ric war between the state, crime syndicates, and commu-
nist guerillas in a bid to consolidate their control over
various parts of the Colombian territory. In deploy-
ing state violence against the armed communist rebels
(FARC), the Colombian government employs state agents
of the Colombian Armed Forces in order to kill and to
eliminate non-state terror groups, including the armed
communist rebels.
During the tenure of Colombian President Alvaro
Uribe (2002–2010), around 8,185 civilians and armed
rebels were killed due to state-based violence (Pettersson
et al. 2019; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019). Con-
sidering the wide magnitude of state violence employed
in Uribe’s war on drugs, Colombia received immense for-
eign military aid and strong political support from the US
government. That foreign support and the Uribe-led gov-
ernment’s violence-focused policy strategy were crucial in
the implementation of Colombia’s war on drugs.
Historically, Colombians have been suffering from
“high levels of organized violence,” but it was in the
1990s that a low-intensity conflict became more se-
rious to the extent that scholars and policy analysts
characterized the period as illustrative of a civil war
(Gray 2008, 63). In 2002, Alvaro Uribe started his pres-
idency and faced three key threats: “an 18,000-strong
drug-financed insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym,
FARC); a 12,000-body paramilitary umbrella group, the
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), also
financed by drug money; and a dwindling leftist in-
surgency, the National Liberation Army (ELN)” (Sweig
2002, 2). Hence, the Uribe administration “inherited an
appalling security situation: an intractable internal con-
flict, a civilian population threatened by illegal armed
groups, and the continued collaboration of the military
and police with paramilitaries who commit human rights
abuses” (Mason 2003, 392).Whereas Duterte’s drug war
targeted drug users as they were the purported cause
of the country’s political and economic problems, the
Uribe government intensified counterinsurgency opera-
tions against armed rebel groups for their alleged involve-
ment in illegal drugs and for challenging the Colombian
state’s territorial sovereignty.Consequently, such state ac-
tions “significantly reduced the number of FARC com-
batants, and guerrillas were forced to retreat toward the
border of the country” (Civico 2016, 11). Faced by
the overall popularity of mano dura or tough-on-crime
stance in Latin American politics (Pereira and Ungar
2004; Wolf 2017), Alvaro Uribe generally maintained
very high favorability ratings during his 8-year term
(around 60–70 percent on average) (Viera 2010). That
high favorability rating dramatically dropped, as one na-
tional survey conducted in 2019 revealed that 69 percent
of the total number of respondents expressed an unfa-
vorable image of Uribe (Redaccion W Radio 2019). Al-
though he was “elected in a landslide by an electorate
frustrated with the failures of peace talks” (Civico 2016,
11), Uribe’s fall from grace emerged after his administra-
tion’s human rights abuses and coercive methods to bring
down political opponents gained traction in the public
sphere (Orozco 2019).
What were the material aspects of Colombia’s war on
drugs? With the support from the US government, the
Uribe administration launched the local “war on drugs,”
which refers to increased state repression of all forms of
non-state violence, such as crime syndicates and armed
communist rebels. This US-funded war on drugs is widely
known as Plan Colombia.7 From the Uribe administra-
tion’s perspective, such non-state armed rebel groups and
illegal drug syndicates have been involved in the use and
proliferation of illegal narcotics as a way to finance their
repressive activities so as to consolidate their control over
Colombian territories.
Figure 3 illustrates the estimated number of civil-
ian deaths resulting from the following types of armed
encounters: (1) state-based violence, where state actors
killed civilians; (2) non-state violence, where none of the
parties is a state actor; (3) one-sided violence, where the
attacks on civilians emerged amidst violence involving
state and non-state actors. Despite the methodological
limitations of data on state violence, the graph below
suggests a pattern of increase in civilian deaths during
the peak of the war on drugs, starting in 2002 until
2006. That pattern of violence demonstrates that the mil-
itaristic approach to the proliferation of illegal drugs ex-
acerbated the severity of political conflict between the
state and armed rebels,while also pervasively killing civil-
ians in the process. As such, the revamped Plan Patriota
(widely known as the second phase of Plan Colombia)
facilitated the increase to 415,000 armed forces members
in 2007 from mere 279,000 in 2000 (Rosen 2014, 56).
7 For a comprehensive analysis of Plan Colombia, refer to
Rosen (2014). Plan Colombia consists of the Plan Patriota,
which was the defense plan by the Uribe-led government
that also enjoyed the support of the US government. The
PlanPatriota consists of theDemocratic Security andDe-
fense Policy doctrines, which sought to gain control of
the territories occupied by armed rebel groups such as
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Figure 3. State-based violence in Colombia (1989–2017). Pettersson et al. (2019).
Uribe’s war on drugs received almost 8 billion USD
worth of military and counterterror assistance from the
US government over the course of a decade (Bagley 2013,
103). Around 80 percent of the US funds allocated for
Plan Colombia were allocated for counternarcotics and
counterterrorism, while a mere 20 percent was allocated
for institutional development and non-militaristic policy
areas such as judicial reforms, refugee assistance, human
rights, and democracy promotion (Frechette 2007, 23).
That budget strategy demonstrates “the greatest level
of counterdrug cooperation ever achieved between the
United States and Colombia”(Frechette 2007, 16), and in
exchange, the Uribe administration made his country as
the only South American ally in the Bush administration’s
2003 invasion of Iraq. For the Bush administration, the
core objective was to curb the flow of illegal drugs into
the United States and to stimulate peace, economic de-
velopment, as well as Andean regional security (Veillette
2005, 1).
The Colombian Armed Forces was one of the largest
institutional beneficiaries of the US-funded war on drugs,
which aimed to bolster state capacities in repressing crim-
inal drug syndicates to eliminate their supposedly illegal
control of some territories. In addition, Uribe’s war on
drugs constituted the “the creation of a network of a
million informants throughout the country, as well as
part-time ‘peasant soldiers’”, who supported the Colom-
bian military in its counterterror operations against
armed rebel groups including drug syndicates (Aviles
2006, 405). Indeed, Uribe’s US-funded war on drugs
aimed for the “consolidation into power of a neoliberal
state within Colombia, the role of transnational lobby-
ing by US and Colombian policy-makers, as well as the
influence of transnational corporations,” while also gen-
erating pervasive killings of civilians (Aviles 2008, 410).
Thus, the role of the United States in Colombia’s human
rights crisis is undeniable, and as Tom Long (2015, 213)
notes, “later investigations have unearthed links be-
tween Uribe’s administration and allies in Congress with
paramilitary groups.” Consequently, a lot of financially
impoverished Colombians died because of abusive state
actions through the drug war. For instance, the “false
positives” scandal in 2008 revealed that the Colombian
army systematically recruited poor people from the
slums and rural areas, promised them some payment or
job, then murdered them, and presented their bodies in
rebel uniforms. The Colombian armed forces, thereafter,
presented those killed as evidence of the state’s victory
in the war on drugs, as they expected financial incentives
for every dead rebel (Eskauriatza 2017; Fellowship of
Reconciliation and Colombia-Europe-U.S. Human
Rights Observatory 2014).
With the subsequent shift of US foreign and domestic
policies towards an overarching counterterror strategy,
the Colombian government’s fight against illegal drugs
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a full-blown militaristic approach in counterterrorism
(Regilme 2018c; Rosen 2014). For Uribe, Plan Colom-
bia aimed to bolster the state’s repressive capabilities in
ways that could severely debilitate, if not totally eradi-
cate, drug traffickers and armed rebels. By launching a
revamped military campaign against drug syndicates and
armed rebel groups, the Colombian government aimed to
eliminate “the war-making capacity of narco-traffickers,
criminals, and terrorist groups and thereby reduces the
level of violence,which enhances the prospects for peace”
(Hindustan Times 2005, 33). Hence, the Uribe adminis-
tration employed a militaristic approach to the problem
of illegal drug proliferation, whereby the government ar-
gues that “strengthening its coercive powers is an essen-
tial step toward recuperating central government con-
trol and the rule of law” (Mason 2003, 401–402). This
militaristic approach to illegal drugs constituted the dra-
matic increase in the manpower of the armed forces, the
creation of mobile brigades, extension of the years of
obligatory military service, acquisition of new military
equipment, capacity-building in counterterrorism, and
substantial reforms in the intelligence services (Mason
2003, 397).
Considering the severity of the illegal drug problem
in Colombia amidst the global terror crisis due to the
9/11 attacks in the United States, “by 2002 many Colom-
bians considered insecurity the country’s greatest prob-
lem,” which motivated the Uribe government to make
“insecurity as its principal project” and to legitimize its
highly violent war on drugs through the discursive ban-
ner of “democratic security” (Denissen 2010, 331–332).
Especially during its early years, Uribe’s war on drugs had
overwhelming support due to its perceived security gains
in cities such as Medellin, which is known for its security
problems generated by illegal drugs (Arsenault 2014). As
the war on drugs generated some sense of public secu-
rity due to reduced drug production, Uribe in 2011 main-
tained that “Colombia is winning,” because cocaine pro-
duction has been reduced from the usual average of 1000
tons per year to only 180 in 2010—a trend that sug-
gests that “Colombia is in a very good part of decline”
(Wilkinson 2011, 4).
What were the ideational features of Colombia’s war
on drugs under the Uribe administration?Howwas peace
to be achieved from the perspective of the Uribe adminis-
tration? For Uribe, intensified state violence is necessary
to gain control of disputed territories that are dominated
by non-state armed rebel groups, including illegal drug
syndicates. Accordingly, state violence is necessary to at-
tain peace and to maintain the political order that makes
human rights possible. Amidst the growing human rights
costs of his militaristic approach to the illegal drugs prob-
lem,Uribe attempted to justify militarization as necessary
in maintaining democracy and human rights. In short, if
peace means the absence of non-state violence and the
preservation of the state’s territorial integrity, then peace
requires the total monopoly of the state’s control over its
claimed territories. As outlined in Uribe’s Democratic Se-
curity policy, which was the landmark policy document
describing the rationale for the war on drugs, the Colom-
bian government disclosed their vision of peace. Hence,
peace constitutes three key elements: (1) the reacquisi-
tion of national territory from armed non-state rebels;
(2) establishment of permanent state presence in those
disputed territories in order to maintain law and order
as well as to promote economic development; and (3) the
negotiation with the three illegal armed rebel groups to
end their rebellion against the Colombian state (Teicher
2005). As a discursive banner that sought to legitimize
the war on drugs, democratic security constituted several
strategies: “aggressively confront the guerrillas and in-
crease the presence of the army and the police throughout
the national territory by significantly increasing military
spending” (Uprimny 2011). Suggesting the close cooper-
ation between non-state terrorism as a threat to democ-
racy, which was a problem that requires militaristic pol-
icy solutions, the Bush administration supported Uribe’s
war on drugs for a variety of converging interests (Bush
2002, 13):
In Colombia, we recognize the link between terror-
ist and extremist groups that challenge the security of
the state and drug trafficking activities that help fi-
nance the operations of such groups. We are working
to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions
and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and
right by extending effective sovereignty over the en-
tire national territory and provide basic security to the
Colombian people.
Uribe also defined peace in terms of negation, partic-
ularly by describing a situation where peace does not ex-
ist: “Poverty and misery are induced because of terror-
ist activity. . . Because of violence people do not invest,
and in the absence of investment, it is impossible to cre-
ate employment, it is impossible to affiliate people to so-
cial security, it is impossible to collect taxes, it is impossi-
ble to pay public debts, it is impossible to expand social
investment. . .” (Teicher 2005, 6; see also Mason 2003,
392). In justifying the war on drugs, Uribe maintained
the exceptional nature of non-state violence and the over-
whelming detrimental consequences of illegal drugs—the
reason for the intensified state violence through the war
on drugs: “The world must understand that this conflict
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solutions. The agents of violence are funded by an inter-
national criminal business—drugs. . . If we do not drive
out drugs, drugs will destroy our freedoms and our ecol-
ogy, and the hope of living in peace will be no more than
an illusion.” (Uribe 2002, 15). In addition, Uribe main-
tained that peace is the negation of terrorism, and com-
batting terror threats requires the full and unconditional
support of the domestic public, rather than political dis-
sent, especially from human rights activists (Office of the
President of Colombia—Ministry of Defence 2003, 5–6):
The antithesis of democratic politics is terrorism. The
terrorist uses violence to impose his will on others,
at the expense of the lives of thousands of civilians.
There can only be one response to terrorism: its de-
feat. Those who continue to engage in such criminal
conduct will feel all the weight of the law.We Colom-
bians will not give in to this threat. We will defeat it
with the support of all citizens. The key concept here
is solidarity. Solidarity between citizens and solidarity
with the security forces. This principle, a pillar of our
constitution, is essential for peaceful coexistence, for
the successful integration of Colombian society. The
massive show of support of the population in cooper-
ating with the authorities has made clear the determi-
nation of Colombians to put an end to terrorism.
Uribe’s war on drugs espouses a notion of peace that
can only be achieved through state violence in order to
protect the state from any terrorist attacks. During the
presidential electoral campaigns in 2002, Uribe was the
lone candidate who advocated for a militaristic approach
to the drug problem, while his rivals such as Ingrid Be-
tancourt (Verde Oxigeno), Noemi Sanin (Si Colombia),
Luis Garzon (Polo Democratico), Horacio Serpa (Par-
tido Liberal) supported political negotiations as the pri-
mary tool for achieving peace (Echavarria 2010, 103). In
2005, when asked about a non-militaristic approach that
focuses on reconciliation with armed rebels, Uribe
maintained that he “understand[s] the concern raised by
offering alternative sentences for grave crimes, but in a
context of 30,000 terrorists, it must be understood that
a definitive peace is the best justice for a nation in which
several generations have never lived a single day with-
out the occurrence of a terrorist act” (Posnanski 2005,
719). For Uribe, peace would only emerge if the armed
non-state rebels will be fully disarmed and surrendered
to the Colombian state, and that objective could only be
achieved through the effective deployment of violence.
This strong commitment to state violence demonstrates
the Uribe administration’s refusal “to build a political
and social agenda that would allow the structural prob-
lems that constitute the root causes of conflict to be dealt
with in depth” (Llorente 2009, 10).
Uribe’s notion of peace primarily pertains to state se-
curity, rather than human security that emphasizes sense
of safety and well-being of individuals within its claimed
territory (Nieto 2007, 117). By employing a militaristic
approach to the problem of illegal drugs, the Uribe ad-
ministration failed to “recognize that Colombian democ-
racy is also under siege from poverty, inequality, and so-
cial exclusion” and not only from the threats posed by
armed non-state rebellion (Nieto 2007, 117). Colombian
President Uribe argued that the abandonment of a peace-
ful resolution with armed non-state rebel groups could be
justified only when Colombians accept that a militaristic
approach is the only option left (Echavarria 2010, 92):
Internally, we have achieved that the whole country,
each and every one of the Colombians, commits it-
self to peace. Before it was thought that this was a
problem only of the Government with the guerrillas.
Today we are aware that it is a war that has been de-
clared violent to society and that we are all those who
have to work to stop it. … we Colombians have to be
united, today more than ever, and we have to be ready
to collaborate with the authorities and to report any
suspicious behavior.
Uribe mobilized political support for his militaristic
agenda by distinguishing supporters of peace as those in
favor of his approach versus those who oppose his poli-
cies. That was especially the case when the Colombian
government tried to justify its landmark Democracy Se-
curity Policy in June 2003 (Echavarria 2010, 93):
Forget the internal divisions and small conflicts and
close ranks against violence. We are not going to
let terrorism divide us in any way. On the contrary:
We will demonstrate civil courage, reject the violent
and defend our country! So we are already doing
all Colombians, as it happened tonight when we all
demonstrated, in a peaceful but forceful way, against
the violence of the intolerant.
Yet, Uribe’s militaristic approach generated the pro-
liferation of state-initiated human rights abuses, all the
while invoking democratic security as a legitimization
doctrine for a highly repressive and violent policy ap-
proach (Regilme 2018c, 356–358). Responding to his
critics, during the years 2003 and 2004, Uribe accused
human rights activists as “terrorists against democracy,”
thereby attempting to undermine their credibility (Brysk
2009, 18–19; Minear 2006, 32). As such, Uribe shamed
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collaborators of armed non-state rebel groups (Haugaard
et al. 2008, 9):
Every time a security policy to defeat terrorism ap-
pears in Colombia, when the terrorists begin to feel
weak, they immediately send their spokespeople to
talk about human rights…These human-rights traf-
fickers must take off their masks, appear with their
political ideas and drop this cowardice of hiding them
behind human rights.
In the Colombia case, the Uribe administration in-
strumentalized the notion of peace as the supposed end
goal of intensified state violence and the resulting human
rights crisis. The Colombian government also used polit-
ically resonant concepts such as “democratic security” in
selling a militaristic war on drugs as a panacea for the
illegal drug problem.
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis provides a critical and compar-
ative assessment of the political logics and discursive
justifications of the war on drugs in the Philippines
and Colombia. Both case studies demonstrate that peace
was constructed from the perspective of state security,
whereby state violence is deployed to eliminate all forms
of non-state armed rebellion, and in some cases, peace-
ful political dissent, including human rights activists and
government critics.
Accordingly, peace requires the state’s monopoly
of violence over all of its claimed territories, and the
unwanted presence of armed non-state rebels, drug
syndicates, and illegal drug users undermines the legit-
imacy of the state. Achieving peace, as the Philippine
and Colombian discourses on wars on drugs indicate,
needs the reinforcement of the state’s coercive capacities
in eliminating all forms of non-state armed rebellion
and dissidence. With its full reliance on increased state
coercion to combat illegal drug use and trafficking, the
Colombian and Philippine governments publicly aspired
for “negative peace,” which underscores the relative
absence of non-state violence. That strategy, however,
did not seriously address the structural socio-economic
conditions that facilitated illegal drug trafficking and
use, thereby discarding the importance of achieving
“positive peace.” Rather than addressing the state’s
systemic failures to rectify material injustices and to
uphold the dignity of individuals from marginalized
groups, the Duterte and Uribe presidencies resorted to
a violent and simplistic policy strategy of absolutizing
their war on drugs as the only pathway to peace. Indeed,
people from economically impoverished background
constitute a substantial, if not the majority, of all the
civilian deaths recorded in the Philippines and Colombia
(Wood 2009; BBC 2015; Eskauriatza 2017; David et al.
2018; Coronel, Kalaw-Tirol, and Pimentel 2019).
Indeed, the Colombian and Philippine case studies
demonstrate the importance of two out of the four
key strands of liberal peace, as described by Richmond
(2006): (1) victor’s peace,which underscores military vic-
tory and the supposed stability of peace through domina-
tion of the winning party in a war, and (2) constitutional
peace, which highlights the stability of the political order
through the rule of law. Thus, both the Uribe and Duterte
administrations relied on military victory through
widespread extrajudicial killings of civilians purportedly
linked to illegal drugs as the supposed effective way of
reinforcing state security, at the expense of human secu-
rity. By publicly castigating and dehumanizing civilians
allegedly involved in illegal drugs, both administrations
rendered those civilians as state enemies, who pose exis-
tential threat to the political order and rule of law. In the
Colombian and Philippine drug wars, the governments
offered a grim diagnosis of the problem of illegal drugs,
asserted the exceptional nature of the threat, upheld that
intensified state violence was the only effective policy so-
lution, and quelled human rights activists and critics.
Notwithstanding the notable similarities in the Philip-
pine and Colombian discourses on peace, the two case
studies differ on several notable areas. Uribe justified that
peace, human rights, and democracy were the end goals
of state violence, whereas Duterte demonstrated a more
ambivalent attitude towards human rights and instru-
mentalized the discourse of the “rule of law”and peace as
justificatory objectives for the widespread state killings of
civilians. In the Philippine case, the Duterte administra-
tion instrumentalized the illegal drugs problem as a diver-
sionary cover for the highly entrenched socio-economic
causes of crime, illegal drug use, and other forms of social
deviance. In doing so, Duterte ordered the intensification
of state violence as prelude for the consolidation of his
power, destruction of democratic checks and balances,
and personal enrichment of personal friends and allies. In
the Colombian case, however, the Uribe administration
signaled a much stronger discursive commitment to
the promotion of liberal democracy in ways that were
remarkably different from Duterte’s revulsion at peaceful
political dissent. In addition, the role of great powers in
domestic violence in the Global South should not be un-
derestimated. In Colombia, the Bush-led US government
provided political and financial support in ways that
expanded the coercive operations of the military and po-
lice. In the Philippines, the Chinese government vowed to






/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa022/5848658 by guest on 29 M
ay 2020
16 Visions of Peace Amidst a Human Rights Crisis
while the Duterte administration has undermined
decades-old strong bilateral ties of Manila with Wash-
ington.8
The analysis herein has several scholarly and pol-
icy implications and contributions. In terms of theory,
I show that political actors use the term of peace as a
discursive tool that seeks to legitimize their policy ac-
tions. For further research, a more systematic investi-
gation of how state leaders and non-state actors con-
struct peace in the public sphere, particularly in terms
of their substantive similarities and differences. In pol-
icy terms, the comparative study of Colombia and the
Philippines suggests that militaristic approaches to the
proliferation of illegal drugs facilitates several unwanted
consequences, such as engendering a human rights cri-
sis, curtailment of institutional checks against potential
abuses of the chief government executive, and the un-
necessary empowerment of the state’s coercive apparatus
without morally conscientious and democratic civilian
control. As shown by the case of Portugal, state invest-
ments on public health infrastructures, education, and
other instruments that improve socio-economic mobil-
ity amongst the poor people are likely to undermine use
of addictive narcotics without sacrificing human rights
(Domoslawski 2011). For that reason, former Colombian
President Cesar Gaviria (1990–1994), in an opinion piece
in The New York Times, warned Duterte about the fail-
ures of the war: “but extrajudicial killings and vigilan-
tism are the wrong ways to go. . .the fight against drugs
has to be balanced so that it does not infringe on the
rights and well-being of citizens” (Gaviria 2017, 9). In-
deed, peace represents the society’s existential search for
utopia—a condition where its institutions consistently re-
spect the dignity and inherent value of every natural hu-
man person within its territory. Notwithstanding its vari-
ations across the globe, the war on drugs has shown that
its supporters failed to realize that the state’s quintessen-
tial responsibility constitutes, at the very least, respect for
the physical integrity of natural persons rather than the
self-serving quests of its leaders for consolidating their
authority for power’s sake.
8 During his time as city mayor, Duterte closely cooperated
with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010) and
her US-supported war on terror in the Philippines. Davao
became a “laboratory for a counterinsurgency strategy
involving arming civilians, many of them recruited from
the city’s criminal underworld, and setting them loose
in poor communities where the insurgents still enjoyed
strong support” (Coronel 2016, 13). See also Regilme
(2015, 135–139) for the links between Duterte, Arroyo, and
the US counterterror operations in the Philippines.
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